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1Abstract
The goal is to characterize optimal growth path in an OLG economy where
capital accumulation is achieved through bequests, without using the assump-
tions of time preference theory on a social level.
First I investigated the Pareto optimality of a bequests plan, which is a
sequence of bequests from one generation to the next one (k1,k 2...).
I found that, in the set L−∪L+ which can be seen as the set of non-oscillating






¯ ¯ ¯ ¯
D2U(kn,k n+1)
D1U(kn+1,k n+2)
¯ ¯ ¯ ¯ ≺ +∞
is necessary and suﬃcient for Pareto-optimality, where U(kn−1,k n) is the level
of utility achieved by generation gnwith an heritage kn−1 and a bequest kn,a n d
D1U and D2U are respectively the ﬁrst and the second partial derivative of U.
This condition implies that, for ”most” generations we have:
−D2U(kn−1,k n) ≤ D1U(kn,k n+1)
which means that generation gn wins less from a decrease of its bequest by one
unit, than what is lost by generation gn+1.
Since the concept of Pareto optimality is too wide to deﬁne the optimal
bequests plan, I investigated consensual optimality. A consensually optimal




where Ψ is a consensual optimality criterion. I showed, under conditions on
U and Ψ that if Ψ is sensitive to long run interest, a steady state consensual
optimum converges necessarily to k∗,w h e r ek∗is solution of
D1U(k∗,k∗)+D2U(k∗,k∗)=0
Moreover, there is a clash between Pareto-optimality and “egalitarianism” of
such a criterion Ψ, where egalitarianism is the quality of a criterion which
treats all generations the same way. However, global egalitarianism may lead to
Pareto-optimality. I qualiﬁed such an egalitarian and Pareto-optimal bequests
plan, as optimal growth path.
I then showed, under assumption of intra-life time neutrality, that the golden
rule is asymptotically observed in an optimal growth path.
To make an optimal growth path consistent with spontaneous equilibrium,
I used familial altruistic utility and determined what familial altruism intensity
can lead to the optimal growth path.
21I n t r o d u c t i o n
The aim of this work is to characterize optimal growth path in an OLG economy
where capital accumulation is achieved through bequests, without using the as-
sumptions of time preference theory on a social level, because such assumptions
introduce necessarily inequality between the diﬀerent generations of the society.
Section2 expounds the economic motivations of the problem and optimality
concepts.
Section3 presents main formal deﬁnitions and assumptions.
To ﬁnd out the ﬁrst order conditions necessary for a bequests plan to be
Pareto-optimal, I apply to it the Kuhn-Tucker theorem.1. This theorem uses
the diﬀerentials of objective function and constraints function, and also the dual
variables. That’s why a study of the structure of l∗
∞ is needed. It is the object
of section4.
The study of l∗
∞ in section4 leads to the calculus of the diﬀerential of a
function on l∞, which will be used to solve consensual optimality and extract
optimal growth paths from the set of Pareto-optima.
Section5 sets up the ﬁrst order necessary condition for Pareto-optima after
computing the diﬀerentials of the objective function Ui and the constraints
function Hi.
With additional assumptions on the life-utility function U, particularly con-
cavity and diﬀerentiability on the border, section6 studies the suﬃciency of ﬁrst
order condition to guarantee the Pareto-optimality of a bequests plan.
Section7 analyses examples of Pareto-optimal bequests plans, particularly
steady states ones.
The concept of consensual optimality, properties of consensual optimality cri-
terions and relation between consensual optima and Pareto optima are worked
out in section8. Section9 shows that, under assumption of intra-life time neu-
trality, golden rule is an asymptotic property of optimal growth paths. Section10
determines to what extent optimal growth paths are consistent with spontaneous
equilibrium.
To lighten the text, some proofs have been gathered in section11, while less
important ones can be found in appendices.
Conclusion is written as an abstract for someone who read all the text, with
hints on possible improvements. It emphasizes on economic interpretation and
does not get back to mathematical aspects.
1See appendix4
32 Motivation
2.1 Inﬁnite horizon sum
Optimization mathematics allowed to build economic models where decisive
economic parameters like the rate of savings or the rate of technical change,
were no longer data of the models, but results explained and computed by the
models.
This increases the explanatory power of growth models, but make them
reckon on the assumption of inﬁnite horizon sum.
Indeed, if we denote u the instantaneous utility function and c(t) the con-




Thus, to ﬁnd the best growth path of economic growth, one maximizes the
above criterion over c(t) under an evolution constraint like:
·
k + c(t)=f(k(t)) − a · k(t)
with c ∈ [0,f (k)] and k(0) = k0
where a is the rate of capital depreciation, f the production function, k the
capital and c the consumption.
The discrete version of this kind of optimality criterion is a discounted sum






Thus, the economy would behave like an inﬁnite-lived individual with a time
discount rate equivalent to the intergenerational discount rate.
As shown by Barro (1974), with operative intergenerational transfers, this
is acceptable in the context of the usual assumptions of time-preference theory
and with a positive rate of own generation preference.
On the personal level, time-preference theory assumes that one always prefers
present goods to future goods. Although this can be criticized in absence of
uncertainty and irrationality, it is not the purpose of this work.
However, the concept of “best growth path” is mainly concerned about social
optimality which relation to time-preference theory is somewhat questionable:
is it natural for social optimality to prefer present time over future? or present
generations over distant ones?
Therefore, we can relevantly ask if we should keep on using the same time-
preference assumptions when looking for the best growth path and if we should
keep on using an inﬁnite horizon sum criterion which inevitably favours present
generations to the detriment of distant ones.
4If we should not favour present generations to the detriment of distant ones,
as pointed out by Allais (1946) or Mankiw (2001), how can we then compute
a social optimum and test its economic eﬃciency without using the inﬁnite
horizon sum?
This is the object of the present work.
First of all, we have to specify the concepts of Pareto optimality and con-
sensual optimality that form social optimality and will be used to deﬁne the
optimal growth path.
2.2 Pareto optimality
To understand optimality problems in OLG models, we need ﬁrst to look for
Pareto-optimal consumption allocations c(t). This issue has been ﬁrst studied
by theorists like Cass(1972), Balasko-Shell(1980) and Wilson(1980), but with
diﬀerent mathematical tools and in a somewhat diﬀerent context, probably more
general because of the focus of this work on capital accumulation. However, this
work permits (I hope) to give some interesting results in an issue as central as
capital accumulation in growth theory.
Intergenerational Pareto-optimality of a consumption allocation means that
it is not possible to ﬁnd a better way to distribute the consumption so as to
strictly enhance the utility of one generation without diminishing utilities of one
or more other generations.
In the beginning of its economic life, a given generation receives a capital kh
as heritage. It consumes and invests during it’s life and disappears bequeathing
a capital kl.
During its life, given kh and kl, the generation chooses the consumption c(t)
that maximizes its individual intra-life utility.
Let k0 be the capital inherited by the ﬁrst generation g1, k1 the capital
bequeathed by g1to g2, k2 the capital bequeathed by g2to g3 and so on...
Given the vector bequests plan K =( k1,k 2,···), each generation gi maxi-
mizes its individual intra-life utility and determines its consumption ci (t) and
its life-utility Ui.
Thus, we can see that the allocation of consumption and the distribution
of utility between generations depend only on the vector K. So, we can speak
of intergenerational Pareto-optimality of the vector K:a b e q u e s t s p l a n K is
Pareto-optimal if there is no other bequests plan that strictly enhances the
utility of one generation without diminishing the utilities of one or more other
generations.
If we exclude technical changes, the utility level reached with a heritage ki−1
and a bequest ki depends only on ki−1,k i.S o ,w ec a nw r i t e :
Ui = Ui(K)=U(ki−1,k i)
We can immediately see that if K is Pareto-optimal, it is a solution to the




subject to : U(bj−1,b j) ≥ U(kj−1,k j) ∀j ≥ 1,j6= i
2.3 Consensual optimality
The concept of Pareto-optimality corresponds to the idea of eﬃcient use of
resources, but it does not take into account the social consensus underlying
social stability and durability. For example, a situation where a unique individ-
ual owns all the wealth can be Pareto-optimal, but it is clearly not a socially
stable situation and a social optimum.
Consequently, an optimal growth path has not only to be a Pareto-
optimum, but it has also to respect a consensual criterion Ψ reﬂecting





The form of Ψ depends on the political system, social values...It is just as
if Ψ expresses the preferences of an “out of the society and time” planner who
incarnates the values and has widely agreed moral authority. We can think
about this criterion as a kind of intergenerational GDP.
63F o r m a l i s m
To concentrate on optimality problems, consider an OLG economy without de-
mographic growth and where individuals of each generation are exactly similar.
Moreover, exclude intra-generational exchanges to eliminate wealth-distribution
and prices questions. Exclude also, as a ﬁrst approach, technical change. Capi-
tal accumulation is achieved through bequests from one generation to the next
one.
3.1 Deﬁnitions
Denote B =( bi)i≥1 the sequence of bequests from one generation to the next
one and U(bi−1,b i) the level of utility a generation gi reaches with a heritage
bi−1 and a bequest bi,w h e r eU is a functional deﬁned on a subset Du strictly
included in R2
+.
U(bi−1,b i) is then the life-utility. It is distinct from the instantaneous utility
u(c(t)) one achieves at the instant t with a consumption c(t).
Name the sequence (bi)i≥1 :abequests plan.
Let l∞+ be the set of real positive and bounded sequences, k0 ar e a lp o s i t i v e
number.
Denote:
D = {K =( k1,k 2,···) ∈ l∞+ / ∀i ≥ 1:( ki−1,k i) ∈ Du}
Suppose that Du is closed, and that it is such as the interior of D is not
empty. Let Ψ be a Frechet-diﬀerentiable functional on l∞.






subject to : U(bj−1,b j) ≥ U(kj−1,k j) ∀j ≥ 1,j6= i





Ab e q u e s t sp l a nK is a Pareto-optimal bequests plan if and only
if it is solution to Pi (K) for all i ≥ 1 and K is a consensual optimum
i fa n do n l yi fi ti ss o l u t i o nt oS (Ψ).
The aim of this work is to characterize Pareto-optimal bequests
plans and consensual optima. This amounts to characterize solutions of
Pi (K) and S (Ψ).
73.2 Assumptions
The following assumptions will be adopted when necessary:
• Du is strictly included in R2, closed and with a non-empty interior
• The interior of D is not empty
• U is of class C1 on the interior of Du , and continuous on Du
• D1U Â 0 (D1U is the derivative of U with respect to its ﬁrst variable)
• Du convex, U concave. One can then show easily that D is also convex.
The condition that U is C1 is a condition of preferences regularity.
The concavity of U means that every mixing between 2 bequests plans is
preferred to the worst of them, which is an usual and acceptable assumption.
The condition D1U Â 0 means that life utility increases when one gets more
heritage, which seems also quite reasonable.









k + c(t)=f(k(t)) − a · k(t);
k(0) = kh;k(T)=kl and c ∈ [0,f (k)]
where u is the instantaneous utility function, δ is a function weighing instanta-
neous utilities of consumption during the life, a the rate of capital depreciation,
f the production function and T the life period, we assume that u and f are
concave and increasing and that f
0
decreases below the parameter a.2
We can then check that the sequence of bequests is bounded.
We see also that for all kh ≥ 0 there is kl max and klmin such that:
kl Â klmax =⇒ U(kh,k l) is not deﬁned
and
kl ≺ klmin =⇒ U(kh,k l) is not deﬁned
So, Du is indeed strictly included in R2. This means that, with a heritage
kh, whatever be the consumption sacriﬁce consented, one cannot bequeath more
than klmax, and whatever be the consumption abuse, one cannot bequeath less
than kl min.
Hence, generally, it comes out that if a bequests plan K is at the frontier of
D then: either the bequest of at least one generation is extreme, or there is a
tendency, even episodically, to this behavior when time goes to inﬁnity.
2Since the object of this work is not the critique of the decreasing returns hypothesis, but
that of inﬁnite horizon optimization, I choose to stay in the framework of neoclassical concav
production function.
84 Preliminary : Study of l∗
∞
4.1 Notations and properties used
Let R b et h er e a ll i n ea n dN the set of positive integers. Let c be the set
of real converging sequences, c0 the set of real sequences converging to 0, l∞
the set of real bounded sequences and l1 the set of real sequences verifying P
n≥1 |xn| ≺ +∞.





• l1 ⊂ c0 ⊂ l∞









4.2 Decomposition of an element y ∈ l∗
∞
Denote δ∞ the linear functional deﬁned on c by δ∞(x) = limxn.
Lemma6:L e ty ∈ l∗
∞. Then we can write in a unique manner:





and y2 is such as its restriction to c is proportional to δ∞.
3If E is a real normed vector space, we denote E∗ the dual of E.
4For proof, see Luenberger p108, quoted reference
5For the proof, see appendix2
6See 11-1 for proof
94.3 Application to the calculus of the diﬀerential of a func-
tion on l∞
Let f be a function from l∞ to R,F r e c h e t - d i ﬀerentiable at x0 ∈ l∞.D e n o t e
δf(x0) the Frechet-diﬀerential of f at x0.B yd e ﬁnition, δf(x0) ∈ l∗
∞.W et h e n
apply Lemma1:
δf(x0)=δf1(x0)+δf2(x0)
where δf1(x0) ∈ l1 and δf2(x0) ∈ c⊥
0 .
Denote the restriction of δf2(x0) to c by δf2(x0)bc. Then, there is a real
α(x0) such that:
δf2(x0)bc = α(x0)δ∞
We can consider δf1(x0) as the ﬁnite part of the diﬀerential, and δf2(x0) as
the inﬁnite part. Denote α(x0) by
∂f
∂∞ (x0).W ep r o v e 7 the following proposi-
tion:
Proposition1 If f is a function from l∞ to R,F r e c h e t - d i ﬀerentiable at















n f(x0 + rn(h)) − f(x0)
δ∞(h)
where rn(h) i st h es e q u e n c eo f c obtained by setting to 0 the n ﬁrst terms of h.
7See appendix9
105 Necessary condition for the Pareto-optimality
of a bequests plan
5.1 Introduction
In this section, we need the following assumptions on U:
• Du is strictly included in R2, closed and with a non-empty interior
• The interior of D is not empty
• U is of class C1 on the interior of Du , and continuous on Du
• D1U Â 0
Let K ∈
◦
D, the interior of D.L e t i ≥ 1.I fK is Pareto-optimal, it is




subject to : Uj(B) ≥ Uj(K) ∀j ≥ 1,j6= i
where
Uj(B)=U(bj−1,b j)
For B ∈ D,d e ﬁne
G(B)=[ Uj(B)]j≥1
where [Uj(B)]j≥1 is the sequence (U1(B),U 2(B),...).
Deﬁne Hi(B) as the sequence obtained by eliminating the ith term from the
sequence G(B) − G(K).S ow eh a v eHi(B)=[ hij(B)]j≥1 such as:
hij(B)=Uj(B) − Uj(K) if 1 ≤ j ≺ i
and
hij(B)=Uj+1(B) − Uj+1(K) if j ≥ i




subject to : Hi(B) ≥ 0
We prove8, under the assumptions of paragraph5-1 on U,t h a tG , Ui and Hi
are Frechet-diﬀerentiable at a point K interior to D a n ds u c ht h a t(k0,k 1) ∈
◦
Du.
The respective Frechet-diﬀerentials are:
δG(K) · ∆K =[ D1U(kj−1,k j)∆kj−1 + D2U(kj−1,k j)∆kj]j≥1
δUi(B)=ei | δG(B)
δHi(B)=Ti(δG(B))
(See the deﬁnition of Ti in 11-2).
8See 11-2 for proof
115.2 Regularity of K for the inequality Hi(B) ≥ 0
K is a regular point for the inequality Hi(B) ≥ 0 if Hi(K) ≥ 0 and if there is
x ∈ l∞ such that Hi(K)+δHi(K) · x Â 09.
The condition of regularity is required to apply the Kuhn-Tucker theorem10.
First, observe that, if in a bequests plan there is i such that D2U(ki−1,k i) Â
0, it cannot be Pareto-optimal. Indeed, an increase of the bequest of gi would
increase the utility of gi and also gi+1 since D1U(ki,k i+1) Â 0. Hence if K is
Pareto-optimal, K ∈ Dl = {B ∈ DÁD2U(bj−1,b j) ≤ 0 for all j ≥ 1}.
Suppose then that K ∈ Dl. Moreover, suppose that D2U(kj−1,k j) ≺ 0 for




B =( b1,b 2,···) ∈ DlÁ∃α Â 0 and n ≥ 1
such that
−D2U(bj−1,bj)





B =( b1,b 2,···) ∈ DlÁ∃α Â 0 and n ≥ 1
such that
−D2U(bj−1,bj)
D1U(bj−1,bj) Â 1+α for j ≥ n
)
Suppose that K ∈ L− ∪ L+.
Under these assumptions on K,w es h o w 11 that K is a regular point for the
inequality Hi(B) ≥ 0.
5.3 Application of the Kuhn-Tucker theorem
Under the assumptions of paragraph5-1 on U and the assumptions of paragraph5-
2o nK ,l e tK ∈
◦
D and such that (k0,k 1) ∈
◦
Du .
As a consequence of the Kuhn-Tucker theorem, if K is a solution of Pi(K)
then there is λ
∗ ∈ l∗
∞ such that, for all ∆K ∈ l∞
δUi(K) · ∆K + hλ
∗ | δHi(K) · ∆Ki =0 (1)
with λ
∗ ≥ 0.
Now apply lemma1 and write:
λ
∗ = λ + β
where λ =( λ1,λ 2,···) ∈ l1 and β ∈ c⊥
0 . We see easily that if ∆K ∈ c0 then
δHi(K)·∆K ∈ c0 and δUi(K)·∆K ∈ c0.S oβ | δHi(K)·∆K =0 . Replace λ
∗
by λ + β in (1),we obtain
δUi(K) · ∆K + hλ | δHi(K) · ∆Ki =0for all ∆K ∈ c0
9This condition means that Hi(K)+δHi(K) · x is an interior point of l∞+ wich means
that all components are strictly positive and that their limit inferior is also strictly positive
10See appendix4
11See 11-3 for proof
12Henceforth, denote u0
hj = D1U(kj−1,k j) and u0
lj = D2U(kj−1,k j).



















for p ∈ [0,+∞]
Since λ ∈ l1,i tv e r i ﬁes
P+∞











¯ ¯ ¯ ¯ ≺ +∞ (3)
If K is a Pareto-optimal bequests plan, then the inequality (3) holds for all
i ≥ 1.
Now drop the assumption D2U(kj−1,k j) ≺ 0 for all j ≥ 1, but keep K ∈ Dl.
Let J = {j/D2U(kj−1,k j)=0 }.I fJ is up-bounded, let q =m a xJ.
If K is Pareto-optimal, the bequests plan extracted from K and beginning
at the generation gq+1 : (kq+1,k q+2,···) is also necessarily Pareto-optimal
when we take (k0,k 1,···kq) as ﬁxed parameters. If K is in
◦
D ∩ (L− ∪ L+),
the extracted plan is also in
◦
Dkq ∩ (L− ∪ L+) and (kq,k q+1) ∈
◦
Du
12.S i n c e
Q+∞
j=q+1 D2U(kj−1,k j) 6=0 ,i tv e r i ﬁes necessarily the condition (3), but with










¯ ¯ ¯ ¯ ¯
≺ +∞
Multiply the above inequality by
q−1 Y
n=0





¯ ¯ ¯ ¯
we ﬁnd again the inequality (3).
If J is not up-bounded, there is episodically a q such that D2U(kq−1,k q)=










¯ ¯ ¯ there is a ﬁnite number of
nonzero terms. Thus, for all i ≥ 1 the sum converges.
We can now state the following proposition:
12We denote Dkq the set{B =( bq+1,b q+2,···) ∈ l∞+ / ∀i ≥ 1:( bq+i−1,b q+i) ∈ Du}
13Proposition2 Let K ∈
◦
D ∩(L− ∪L+) a n ds u c ht h a t(k0,k 1) ∈
◦
Du.U n d e r
the assumptions of paragraph5-1 on U,i f K is a Pareto-optimal bequests plan










¯ ¯ ¯ ¯ ≺ +∞
146S u ﬃciency
6.1 Introduction
Under the following assumptions, U is Frechet-diﬀerentiable on the border of
Du:13
• Du is strictly included in R2, closed, convex and with a non-empty interior
• U is of class C1 on the interior of Du , and continuous on Du.
• D1U and D2U are extendable by continuity on b Du = Du −
◦
Du.
We add also to the previous assumptions:
• D1U Â 0
• The interior of D is not empty
• U concave
The assumption U concave implies that D is also closed and convex.
We then show, like in section5,14 that G is Frechet-diﬀerentiable on the
border of D.
As in section5, we conclude that Ui and Hi are Frechet-diﬀerentiable on the
border of D too.
6.2 Stationarity of the Lagrangian
For K ∈ D and i ≥ 1 deﬁne the Lagrangian Li from D × l1 to R such as
Li(B,µ)=Ui(B)+hµ | Hi(B)i, and suppose, if i Â 1,t h a t
Qi−1
j=1 u0
lj 6=0 .T h e











¯ ¯ ¯ ¯ ≺ +∞
then we can see that λ ∈ l1.L i k eUi and Hi , Li is diﬀerentiable with respect
to B o nt h ei n t e r i o ra n dt h eb o r d e ro fD.I t sd i ﬀerential, computed at µ = λ
and B = K is δLi(K,λ)=δUi(K)+hλ | δHi(K)i.S i n c eλ ∈ l1, for ∆K ∈ l∞
we have
δLi(K,λ) · ∆K = δUi(K) | ∆K + λ |h δHi(K) · ∆Ki
= δUi(K) | ∆K +l i m
n−→+∞(λ1,λ 2,···,λ n) |h δHi(K) · ∆Ki
13See appendix6 for the deﬁnition of Frechet-diﬀerentiability on the border and appendix7
for U Frechet-diﬀerentiability.
14See appendix8
15Replace (λj) by their values in (2), we obtain
δUi(K) | ∆K +( λ1,λ 2,···,λ n) |h δHi(K) · ∆Ki = λnu0
ln+1∆kn+1
which tends to 0 when n tends to inﬁnity.
Thus δLi(K,λ)=0 . In other words, the Lagrangian Li is stationary at
(K,λ).
6.3 A suﬃcient condition to solve Pi(K)
Under the assumptions of paragraph6-1 on U,l e tK ∈ Dl and i such that if
i Â 1 we have:
Qi−1
j=1 u0
lj 6=0 . We then deduce from the system (2) that λj ≥ 0
for all j ≥ 1.S i n c eU is concave, we can easily see that Ui and Hi are concave
too. Thus, Li is concave with respect to B. As a result, for all B ∈ D and
α ∈ ]0,1[ we have:
Li((1 − α)K + αB,λ) ≥ (1 − α)Li(K,λ)+αLi(B,λ)
then
Li(K + α(B − K),λ) − Li(K,λ)
α
≥ Li(B,λ) − Li(K,λ)
since Li is Frechet-diﬀerentiable, when α tends to 0 we obtain:
δLi(K,λ) | (B − K) ≥ Li(B,λ) − Li(K,λ) (4)










¯ ¯ ¯ ¯ ≺ +∞
we have δLi(K,λ)=0 .
We then deduce from (4) that for all B ∈ D:
Li(B,λ) − Li(K,λ) ≤ 0 (5)
We now show that K solves Pi(K). Suppose there is B in D such that
Ui(B) Â Ui(K) and Hi(B) ≥ 0.W eh a v eHi(K)=0so Hi(B) ≥ Hi(K). Since
λ ≥ 0 we have λ | Hi(B) ≥ λ | Hi(K). Finally Ui(B)+λ | Hi(B) Â Ui(K)+λ |
Hi(K). This contradicts (5). Hence, we can state:
Proposition3 Under the assumptions of paragraph6-1 on U,l e tK ∈ Dl














¯ ¯ ¯ ¯ ≺ +∞
then K is solution of Pi(K).
























¯ ¯ ¯ ¯ ≺ +∞
!
for all i ≥ 1
Now remember that if K is a solution of Pi(K) for all i ≥ 1,t h e nK is a
Pareto-optimal bequests plan. Thus, we can state:
Proposition4 Under the assumptions of paragraph6-1 on U,l e tK ∈ D











¯ ¯ ¯ ¯ ≺ +∞
then K is a Pareto-optimal bequests plan.
From proposition2 and proposition4, we deduce the following theorem:
Theorem1 Under the assumptions of paragraph6-1 on U,l e tK ∈
◦
D∩(L−∪
L+) such that (k0,k 1) ∈
◦
Du and such that for all i ≥ 1 we have D2U(ki−1,k i) ≺










¯ ¯ ¯ ¯ ≺ +∞
177 Examples of Pareto optimal plans
7.1 A region of Pareto-optima
We adopt in all this section the same assumptions than in last section.







and L0 = {(h,l) ∈ DuÁD2U(h,l)=0 } as
r e p r e s e n t e di nt h ef o l l o w i n gﬁgure.
If K is in
L− =
(
B =( b1,b 2,···) ∈ DlÁ∃α Â 0 and n ≥ 1
such that
−D2U(bj−1,bj)


































































































lj ≺ 0 for all j ≥ 1, we can then apply theorem1 and conclude
that K is Pareto-optimal.
K ∈ L− means graphically that from a given index n, K’s components are
under the line L without approaching it.
Thus :
Proposition5 Under the assumptions of paragraph6-1 on U,a l lb e q u e s t s
plans which components are, from a given index in l− without approaching the
line L, are Pareto-optima.
This condition implies that, for ”most” generations we have:
−D2U(kn−1,k n) ≺ D1U(kn,k n+1)
which means that if generation gn decreases its bequest by one unit, it
wins less than what is lost by generation gn+1. The condition
D2U(kn−1,k n) ≺ 0
can be taken as an interiority condition with respect to the set of relevant
bequests plans.
18Figure 1:
7.2 Steady state Pareto-optima
At the point (k∗,k∗) , the line h = l is tangent to a line U(h,l)=U∗,s ow e
have
D1U(k∗,k∗)=−D2U(k∗,k∗)
Such a point does not necessarily exist. But if it does15, a steady state bequests





We will suppose henceforth that k∗ exists and that D2U(k∗,k∗) 6=0 .
None of the steady state bequests plans which limits are over k∗ is Pareto-
optimum. All steady state bequests plans under k∗are Pareto-optima.
Let B∗ be a steady state bequests plan which components are
equal to k∗ from a given index. B∗ is not a regular point of the inequal-
ity Hi(B) ≥ 0. Indeed, from a given index, Hi(B∗)+δHi(B∗) · x is propor-
tional to [(xj−1 − xj)]j≥1with a positive coeﬃcient of proportionality. To obtain
Hi(B∗)+δHi(B∗) · x Â 0 we have to take x decreasing. Since x is in l∞, the
sequence converges and
xj−1 − xj −→ 0 when j −→ +∞
Consequently, Hi(B∗)+δHi(B∗) · x cannot be in the interior of l∞+.
15The question of existence of k∗is not a diﬃcult problem. To lighten the text, it has been
avoided. Nevertheless, it is addressed in a forthcoming work.
19Figure 2:
















¯ ¯ ¯ ¯ =+ ∞
But it does not mean that B∗ is not Pareto-optimal since B∗ is not a regular
point of Hi(B) ≥ 0.
On the contrary, we can show that:
Proposition6 B∗ is Pareto-optimal.
Proof: We ﬁrst observe that, for K =( k1,k 2, ···) ∈ Dl,i fa ne x t r a c t e d
plan (kn,k n+1, ···) is Pareto-optimal for generations (gn,g n+1, ···),t h e nK is
Pareto-optimal16. It is therefore enough to show Pareto-optimality for the plan
K∗ which all components are equal to k∗and with k0 = k∗. We show this
graphically. Consider the ﬁrst generation to try to enhance its utility level. It
will bequeath a smaller capital than k∗,s a yk1. All the following generations will
decrease their bequest to keep at least a utility level of U∗ = U(k∗,k∗).W es e e
in the following ﬁgure that there will be a generation that will fall short of the
level U∗ even if it bequeaths 0. Hence, it is not possible to enhance utility level
of one generation without decreasing utility levels of some other generations.
Thus K∗ is Pareto-optimal, and so is B∗.
¥
The criterion maxK limU(kj−1,k j) gives best plans for remote generations.
Thus B∗ is the best steady state plan for remote generations.
If the economy begins with k0 Â k∗, generations have to bequeath
less than they inherit until they reach k∗. If they do not, not only their
16We can show that by supposing that K is not Pareto-optimal. This will leads us to ﬁnd
ap l a nt h a td o m i n a t e s(kn,k n+1, ···), which contradicts its Pareto-optimality.
20bequests plan will not be good for remote generations but also it will not even
be Pareto-optimal.
If the economy begins with k0 ≤ k∗, either it can tend to a steady state limit
k∞ ≺ k∗with a Pareto-optimal bequests plan, or it can tend to the limit k∗
which is better for remote generations but require from immediate generations
to bequeath more. Consequently, if k0 ≺ k∗, one cannot enhance utility
level of remote generations without decreasing immediate generations
ones.
The condition k∞ ≤ k∗implies that
−D2U(k∞,k ∞) ≤ D1U(k∞,k ∞)
which means that, asymptotically, one unit decrease of bequest adds less utility
than what is lost by the simultaneous and equal decrease of heritage.
If we consider long run interest, each generation should increase
bequest until its marginal utility for next generation comes to heritage
marginal utility. Then we get to the value k∗where
−D2U(k∗,k∗)=D1U(k∗,k∗)
218 Consensual optimum
8.1 First order condition
We adopt in all this section the same assumptions than in last section.
As deﬁned in section2, a consensual optimum is a bequests plan maximizing
an inter-generations criterion Ψ(G(B)),w h e r eΨ(x) is a Frechet-diﬀerentiable
function from l∞ to R. Suppose that
◦
G(D) 6= ∅. Suppose also that Ψ is nonde-
creasing and concave17.This means that an increase in the utility of generation
gi without change for other generations, increases the value of Ψ. For example,
we can take a linear criterion Ψ(G(B)) = y | G(B) where y ∈ l∗
∞+.




The necessary ﬁrst order condition is
δ[ΨG](K) · ∆B =0for all ∆B ∈ l∞
and this condition is suﬃcient even if K is not interior since ΨG is concave.
Using proposition1, we write:
δΨ(x)=δΨ1(x)+δΨ2(x) where δΨ1(x) ∈ l1 and δΨ2(x) ∈ c⊥
0
For x ∈ c we have18

























for all i ≥ 1.
and20:
Proposition7 Under the assumptions of paragraph6-1, all interior maximiz-
ers of the criterion Ψ(G(B)) verifying ∂Ψ
∂x1(G(K)) 6=0and D2U(ki−1,k i) ≺ 0
for all i ≥ 1,w h e r eΨ is a Frechet-diﬀerentiable function on l∞,a r eP a r e t o -
optima.
17For the same reason than the concavity of U
18See paragraph4-3
19See 11-4-1 for proof
20See 11-4-2 for proof
228.2 Egalitarianism
First, we deﬁne some interesting properties for Ψ.
Deﬁnition1 Ψ is non-saturable at inﬁnity if and only if Ψ0
∞(G(B)) Â 0 for
all B ∈ D.
This property means that the consensual criterion always increases strictly
when utility of remote generations increases strictly. Thus this property war-
rants that the criterion is sensitive to long run interest.
Deﬁnition2 Ψ is “locally egalitarian” at a point G if and only if Ψ0
i(G)=0
for all i ≥ 1.
As seen in section2, one of the essential reasons to work in an OLG context, is
the preoccupation about equality between generations. Even if equality is not a
demanded condition, we need at least to compare it to the analyzed situation21.
The following proposition22 clariﬁes deﬁnition2:
Proposition8 Let s be a one-to-one mapping on N∗ and deﬁne b s the trans-
formation on l∞ such that, for G =( gi) ∈ l∞, b s(G)=( gs(i)).T h e n , Ψ is
locally egalitarian at a point G if and only if:
δΨ(G) · ∆G = δΨ(G) · b s(∆G) (7)
for all s and for all ∆G ∈ c in a given neighborhood of G.
The condition (7) means that if we change components order in ∆G,i t
does not change the consensual value. Thus, it expresses the idea of an equal
importance of wealth increase for all generations in the eyes of what we called
social consensus or “out of society and time” planner in section2.
21For much of the ideas developed here, I am indebted to M. Allais’s “Economie et interet”. I
f o u n da l s oam o r ea c c e s s i b l ee x p o s éo fs o m ei m p o r t a n ti s s u e si nMacroeconomics of G.Mankiw.
For example, about intergeneration equality we can read p116: “We then see that optimal
capital accumulation is essentially function of the importance that we give to present and
future generations. If we put them (generations) on the same level, (optimal path) will have
to reach the golden rule’s capital level.” This is exactly what is shown in present and next
section.
Notice that original G.Mankiw text is certainly somewhat diﬀerent from what I quoted
because I translated back to English the French translation available to me. Nevertheless, I
hope that the meaning is preserved.
22See 11-5
238.3 Egalitarianism versus eﬃciency in steady states case
Suppose now that the solution K of (6) is in c ( i ti se q u i v a l e n tt os a yt h a t
K is a steady state plan) and take ∆B ∈ c.T h e n δG(K) · ∆B ∈ c.D e n o t e
u0
l =l i m D2U(kn−1,k n) and u0












Then K converges to k∗.
With the help of proposition7 we deduce:
Theorem2 If the criterion deﬁning a consensual optimum is non-saturable
at inﬁnity, all steady state bequests plans that are interior consensual optima
converge necessarily to k∗.L e tK be such an interior consensual optimum such
that D2U(ki−1,k i) ≺ 0 for all i ≥ 1.I fΨ is not locally egalitarian at G(K),
then K is Pareto-optimal.
Hence, as long as non-saturability at inﬁnity, which means sensitivity at
inﬁnity, is respected, changing the criterion Ψ can only change the speed of
convergence to k∗ (number of generations necessary to get close enough to k∗)
but not the “destination” k∗.
The second assertion of theorem2 is somewhat amazing : local egalitari-
anism does not warrant eﬃciency (Pareto-optimality), while its opposite
(favouritism) does.
To try to ﬁnd more “optimistic” properties for egalitarianism, let’s deﬁne
global egalitarianism:
Deﬁnition3 Ψ is “globally egalitarian” if and only if
Ψ0
i(G)=0
for all i ≥ 1 and for all G ∈ c.
The following proposition23 clariﬁes deﬁnition3:
Proposition9 Let s be a one-to-one mapping on N∗ and deﬁne b s as in
proposition8. Then, if Ψ is globally egalitarian, we have:
Ψ(b s(G)) = Ψ(G)
for all s and for all G ∈ c24.
23See proof in 11-6
24Although the reciprocal implication seems true, I have failed yet to prove it.
24Remark If we suppress the condition G ∈ c in the deﬁnition of global egal-
itarianism and ∆G ∈ c in the deﬁnition of local egalitarianism, these concepts
would be tighter but much more diﬃcult to characterize. So, I kept G ∈ c.
Let K be an interior consensual optimum for the non-saturable-at-inﬁnity
criterion Ψ such that Ψ is not locally egalitarian at G(K) and D2U(ki−1,k i) ≺









Ψ non locally egalitarian implies that Ψ0
1 6=0 .S i n c e limn Ψ0








hj+1 =0 . This implies that (kn−1,k n) never reaches endlessly
(k∗,k∗) which means that there is, at least episodically, a deviant generation
that gets away from k∗.H o w e v e r ,K is Pareto-optimal.
Although, rigorously, condition (8) is only necessary to interior consensual
optimality, I wrongly call a plan checking (8): a consensual optimum. If Ψ is
globally egalitarian, all consensual optima are not necessarily Pareto-optima,
but some of them are. For example, the plan where ﬁrst generations bequeath
their maximum bequest until they reach k∗ and then the remaining generations
stay at k∗, is a consensual optimum and a Pareto optimum. This plan is the
faster way to reach k∗.
Observing that this plan is the best state for long run interest,w ec a n
assert:
Proposition10 A globally egalitarian non-saturable-at-inﬁnity consensual
criterion enables the fastest consensus-optimal and Pareto-optimal attainment
of the best state for long run interest k∗. Whereas with a non locally egalitar-
ian, non-saturable-at-inﬁnity consensual criterion, every consensual optimum is
Pareto optimal but there is endlessly a deviant generation from k∗.
8.4 Optimal growth path
As said in section2, an optimal growth path has to be Pareto-optimal and
consensus-optimal. We limit henceforth our interest to steady state optimal
growth paths.
Denote k∞ the limit of a steady state bequests plan. k∞ = k∗
= means that
from a given index n we have kn = k∗, k∞ = k∗
− means that kn −→ k∗ with
kn ≺ k∗, k∞ = k∗
+ means that kn −→ k∗ with kn Â k∗, k∞ = k∗
−+ means that
kn −→ k∗ with oscillations round k∗.
With a globally egalitarian criterion (non saturable at inﬁnity), the following
table characterizes steady state plans to show up which ones are optimal growth
paths.





Pareto optimality yes ? yes ? ? no
consensual optimality no yes yes yes yes no





D ∩ (L− ∪ L+) . We cannot apply
theorem1.
However, for the case k∗











S i n c ew ec a n n o tc l e a r l ys e et h a t ,w em a yu s eR a b e e - D u h a m e lc r i t e r i o nw h i c h
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¯ ¯ ¯ ≺ +∞. The interpretation is that the bequests plan
must not tend “too rapidly” to k∗.
Consequently, only k∗
= is doubtlessly an optimal growth path. On top of
that, the plan k∗
= is the fastest to reach k∗.
269 Golden rule
The golden rule : capital marginal productivity = rate of capital depreciation,
characterizes the best steady state in an economy governed by a Solow model,
which is one of the ﬁrst, the simplest, but more insightful models in growth
theory. In this model, the sharing between consumption and saving is not the
result of an optimization decision, but a ﬁxed parameter as supposed in key-
nesian theory. Indeed, Solow’s goal was to criticize Harrod-Domar model by
accepting all its keynesian assumptions except that of ﬁxed proportions produc-
tion . Solow’s economy converges to a steady state depending on the savings
rate. The golden rule steady state is obtained by imposing the golden savings
rate equal to the quotient of marginal productivity on average productivity.
Here, under intra-life time neutrality assumption, we ﬁnd similar results,
but with a dynamic of savings behaviors governed by the needs of consensual
optimality and Pareto optimality.
Intra-life time neutrality means that a generation does not care when it
consumes, as long as it is during its lifetime. Thus, the discount rate ρ in the
expression of life utility
R T
0 u(c(t))e−ρtdt is taken 025.









k + c(t)=f(k(t)) − a · k(t) ;
k(0) = h ; k(T)=l and c ∈ [0,f (k)]
where u is a concave function, C1on ]0,+∞[, such that all section6 conditions
on U are veriﬁed. Then any optimal growth path veriﬁes the golden rule, and
the asymptotic savings rate is the golden savings rate. Moreover, this is true for
any bequests plan tending to k∗.
Proof: Write the Hamiltonian:
H = u(c)+λ(f(k) − a.k − c)
We have c∗ =a r g m a x H.I f λ ∈ [u0f(k),u 0(0)] then u0(c)=λ and dλ
dt =
−λ(f0(k) − a).D e n o t e kg the capital verifying the golden rule f0(k)=a.I n
the phase plan (k,λ),t h el i n edλ
dt =0is then the straight line{k = kg} .T h e
line dk
dt =0is {λ = u0(f(k) − a.k)}. kg is a minimizer of this line. Below
the line {λ = u0f(k)}, the condition c ≤ f(k) becomes active and the equation
dλ
dt = −λ(f0(k)−a) is no longer true. We can now draw the phase plane of this
program.
25This assumption may look as naive but ρ 6=0would mean that consumption in the
beginning of life weighs more than in other periods of life, which would not reﬂect life utility,
but utility at a given time.
27Figure 3:
We see in the above ﬁgure that if one begins with a capital h = kg and then
changes his capital stock by his consumption choice, he cannot return on the
line {k = kg}. We deduce that if h = kg and l = kg,t h eo p t i m a lc(t) must hold
capital stock exactly at the level kg.W et h e nh a v eλg = u0(f(kg) − a.kg) and
c(t)=f(kg) − a.kg for all t ∈ [0,T].
Deﬁne V (h,l,r,s) as follows:







k + c(t)=f(k(t)) − a · k(t) ;
k(0) = h ; k(T)=l and c ∈ [0,f (k)]
We have V (h,l,0,T)=U(h,l) , V 0
h(h,l,0,T)=U0
h(h,l) and V 0
l (h,l,0,T)=
U0
l(h,l). We know that if there is a point k∗ such that Uh(k∗,k∗)+Ul(k∗,k∗)=0 ,
k∗ is unique (see previous section). As a result of the equations of Hamilton-
Jacobi-Bellman26 applied on V at the point (kg,k g,0,T),w eh a v e :
c(0) = argmax{u(c)+V 0
h(f(kg) − akg − c)}
c(T) = argmax{u(c) − V 0
l (f(kg) − akg − c)}











u(c) − V 0
l (f(kg) − akg − c)
ª
=0
See Marti, quoted reference.
28Figure 4:
since u0(f(kg)) ≤ λg ≤ u0(0) (see phase plane) and λ(r)=V 0




u0(c(0)) − V 0
h =0
u0(c(T)) + V 0
l =0
We have seen above that c is constant if h = l = kg.T h e nu0(c(0)) = u0(c(T))
and V 0
h + V 0
l =0 .










We look now to the savings behaviors necessary to reach k∗.
If k0 ≺ k∗: Suppose that before generation1, economy was stationary at k =
k0. A generation who will enhance bequest will have to enhance its savings rate
above ak
f(k). So it will necessarily sacriﬁce utility as we have seen in section7. In
the following ﬁgure, dotted lines in region1 represent jumps from a generation to
the next one. Continuous lines represent trajectories of “sacriﬁced ”generations.
27See Marti, quoted reference.
29As we get closer to k∗, the savings rate will decrease back to ak
f(k) and the
life utility U(h,l) will increase. Hence, the eﬀorts accepted by immediate
generations will beneﬁtt ot h ei n ﬁnity of remote generations and there
is not another way to reach k∗.
If k0 Â k∗: As said in section7, staying in this situation is not Pareto-
optimal. Decreasing savings rate is good for immediate generations
as for remote ones. Economy will depart from region3 and end to k∗and
savings rate will decrease to its golden rule level.
If k0 = k∗: Generations will just have to keep a constant consump-
tion c∗ = f(k∗) − a.k∗which warrants the golden savings rate.
3010 Welfare analysis
10.1 Selﬁsh and altruistic utility
If everyone behaves only according to what his pure selﬁshness dictates, the
optimal growth path would not be stable. The ﬁrst generation that is free to




If the generation does not bequeath lmin, it must be because of one of the
three following reasons:
First, it can be compelled by the planner. But it is hard to imagine that.
Planner can ﬁx prices or production, but not bequests.
Second, it can be so altruistic that it maximizes the consensual criterion Ψ
instead of its utility. This supposition is not completely utopian because some
people determine their behavior according to collective interests. For example,
some Europeans don’t buy Japanese cars although they may be competitive, be-
cause it would lead to European GDP decrease. We can also combine individual
utility U an consensual criterion Ψ and use something like λU +( 1− λ)Ψ.
Thirdly, we can suppose that individual utility depends on heirs’ utility. This
assumption appears as the more appropriate to our problem. We can name it :
familial altruism or intergenerational altruism. This concept have been used by
Brenheim-Ray(1987) or Lakshmi(2002). The point is then to see if this limited
altruism could lead to the optimal growth path. In other words, we try to ﬁnd
out what familial altruism intensity can lead to the optimal growth
path.
We suppose that we can decompose the individual utility V as follows:
V = U + A
where U is the classical selﬁsh utility depending on personal consumption
and A is the altruistic utility depending on the capital bequeathed to next
generation. Thus
V (h,l)=U(h,l)+A(l)
where U is the utility function used in previous sections (with assumptions of
section6 ) and A is the altruistic utility.
A has to be nondecreasing with l since altruistic feelings are satisﬁed when
bequest increases. We also suppose that A is C1 and strictly concave28 on R.
28Concavity requirement on A means decreasing marginal altruistic utility.
3110.2 Honour your heir, but not more than yourself!





where h = kn−1
Denote lmin(h) and lmax(h) respectively the lower bound and the upper
bound of {lÁ(h,l) ∈ Du}.I f 29
U0
l(h,lmax(h)) + A0(lmax(h)) ≤ 0 and U0
l(h,lmin(h)) + A0(lmin(h)) ≥ 0
then the solution ϕ(h) of (9) veriﬁes
U0
l(h,ϕ(h)) + A0(ϕ(h)) = 0.
We will suppose that.
In a spontaneous equilibrium we have kn = ϕ(kn−1) for n ≥ 1.I fas p o n t a -
neous equilibrium is an optimal growth path, then k∗ = ϕ(k∗).B u tU0
h(k∗,k∗)=
−U0
l(k∗,k∗) then, we can assert
Proposition12 If a spontaneous equilibrium is an optimal growth path, then
U0
h(k∗,k∗)=A0(k∗) (10)
The left hand side of equation (10) is the increase of selﬁsh utility resulting
from an increase of heritage by one unit. The right hand side is the increase
of altruistic utility resulting from an increase of bequest by one unit. The
interpretation is that spontaneous equilibrium cannot be optimal growth
path unless generations feel (asymptotically) about their heirs as they
feel about themselves.
If A0(k∞) ≺ U0
h(k∞,k ∞) ,t h e nU0
h(k∞,k ∞)+U0
l(k∞,k ∞) Â 0 which implies
k∞ ≺ k∗.S oif feelings toward heirs are deﬁcient, economy will stay in
underaccumulation.
Similarly, if A0(k∞) Â U0
h(k∞,k ∞) ,t h e nk∞ Â k∗. If feelings toward
heirs are excessive, economy will go in overaccumulation.
10.3 Transitory state
The condition (10) is necessary for a spontaneous equilibrium to be an optimal
growth path, but it is not suﬃcient. We have to make sure that the sequence
kn = ϕ(kn−1) converges.
29The condition U0
l(h,lmin(h)) + A0(lmin(h)) ≥ 0 m e a n st h a ti ti sa l w a y sb e t t e rt ob e -
quest more than lmin(h). Without this condition, adding A to U would not change anything
to spontaneous equilibrium and economy would go in underaccumulation. The condition
U0
l(h,lmax(h)) +A0(lmax(h)) ≤ 0 means that it is always better to bequest less than lmax(h).
Without this condition, U would be useless and economy would go in overaccumulation.








We can impose a minimum concavity condition on A to make sure the spon-
taneous equilibrium converges.








for all h for which the last expression is deﬁned, then |ϕ0(h)| ≺ α. This implies
|kn+1 − kn|¹α|kn − kn−1| and sequence (kn) converges to the unique solution
of k = ϕ(k), k∗ .







Under conditions (10) and (11) (or (12) if k0 is close enough to k∗), consen-
sual optimality is warranted but still not Pareto optimality.




not necessarily Pareto-optima according to paragraph8-4. But if ϕ0(k)=0in a
neighborhood of k∗, which is equivalent to
U”
lh(k,k)=0
and if k0 is in this neighborhood, we will be in the case k∗
= w h i c hi sa no p t i m a l
growth path.
3311 Proofs
1 1 . 1 P r o o fo fl e m m a 1
11.1.1 Projection from l∗
∞ on l1
For i ≥ 1,l e tei be the element of l∞ such that all its components are zero
except the ith which is 1.
Let y ∈ l∗
∞. Consider the sequence: (y | ei)i≥1. This sequence is in l1.30 De-
note Φ the mapping from l∗
∞ to l1 which associates to y the sequence (y | ei)i≥1 .
Φ is a projection from l∗
∞ to l1. Indeed, it is a linear transformation and, con-
sidering l1as a subset of l∗
∞,i fy ∈ l1then Φ(y)=y.
11.1.2 Decomposition of an element y ∈ l∗
∞ by Φ
Consider the mapping Identity I from c0 to l∞:
I : c0 −→ l∞
x−→x
We can verify easily that Φ is the adjoint operator of I,w h a tw ew r i t e :
Φ = I∗





R(I)={y ∈ l∞Á∃x ∈ c0 : I(x)=y} = c0
and




For y ∈ l∗
∞,d e ﬁne k = Φ(y) − y.W ec a nw r i t e :
y = Φ(y)+k.
with Φ(y) ∈ l1 and k ∈ c⊥
0 .
We have decomposed an element y of l∗
∞ as a sum of an element of l1 and
an element of c⊥
0 . We easily show that this decomposition is unique.
30W es h o wt h i sl i k ew eh a v es h o w nt h a t(f(en))n≥1is in l1.S e ea p p e n d i x 2 .
31The adjoint of a continuous linear operator is continuous too.
32See Luenberger p155 quoted reference.
3411.1.3 Study of c⊥
0
We have:










∀α ∈ R : kαδ∞k = |α|kδ∞k = |α|
so we can apply Hahn-Banach theorem33, and extend αδ∞ with an element of
l∗
∞,s a yβ.
Denote B the set of such linear functionals. We now show that c⊥
0 = B.
We see easily that B is a vector subspace of l∗
∞ included in c⊥
0 . Reciprocally,
let β ∈ c⊥
0 and x ∈ c.D e n o t e e =( 1 ,1···).W e h a v e x − (δ∞ | x)e ∈ c0,s o
hβ | (x − (δ∞ | x)e)i =0 .T h u s β | x =( β | e)(δ∞ | x). T h i sp r o v e st h a tt h e
restriction of β to c is proportional to δ∞.T h e nβ ∈ B and c⊥
0 ⊂ B.¥
11.2 Diﬀerentiability of G, Ui and Hi
11.2.1 Diﬀerentiability of Ui and Hi
Let Ti be the transformation which suppresses the ith component of an element
of l∞, replaces it by the next one, and shifts all the following components
backward. We have
Hi(B)=Ti(G(B) − G(K)) (13)
We have also
Ui(B)=ei | G(B) (14)
Suppose that G is Frechet-diﬀerentiable at B.T h e s y m b o l δ preceding a
transformation means its Frechet-diﬀerential. From equations (13) and (14) we




It remains to prove Frechet-diﬀerentiability of G.
11.2.2 Diﬀerentiability of G
First, we build a compact subset E(K,r) included in
◦
Du such that the open
sphere S(K,r) of center K and radius r is included in
◦
D and such that all its
points have their successive pairs of components in E(K,r)34. r is a strictly
positive real. Then we deﬁne the function o :
o(u,v,x,y)=











u2 + v2 =0 .




¤2 × E(K,r). Since this set is compact, o is uniformly
continuous on it. Hence, for ε Â 0 there is α Â 0 such that
p




for all (x,y) in E(K,r). (15)
For j =1 ,t a k e∆kj−1 = ∆k0 =0 .
If K + ∆K ∈ S(K,r),t h e n(kj−1 + ∆kj−1,k j + ∆kj) ∈ E(K,r).M o r e o v e r ,
if k∆Kk ≺ α √




j ≺ α. We can then apply (15)
an write |o(∆kj−1,∆kj,k j−1,k j)| ≺ ε √
2.
If we deﬁne δG(K) by
δG(K) · ∆K =[ D1U(kj−1,k j)∆kj−1 + D2U(kj−1,k j)∆kj]j≥1
we have







¯ ¯ ¯ ¯
U(kj−1 + ∆kj−1,k j + ∆kj) − U(kj−1,k j)
−D1U(kj−1,k j)∆kj−1 + D2U(kj−1,k j)∆kj
¯ ¯ ¯ ¯
=
supj≥1





















kG(K + ∆K) − G(K) − δG(K) · ∆Kk
k∆Kk
−→ 0 when k∆Kk −→ 0
This proves that δG(K) is the Frechet-diﬀerential of G at K.¥
11.3 Regularity of K
Denote u0
hj = D1U(kj−1,k j) and u0
lj = D2U(kj−1,k j).
We have Hi(K)=0 .D e n o t eθj = u0
hjxj−1 +u0
ljxj,w h e r ex0 =0and j ≥ 1.
Then Hi(K)+δHi(K) · x =( θj)j≥1,j6=i.
For j ≥ i+1,i fK ∈ L− ,t a k exi a strictly positive real. Take xj such that




ljxj−1,x j−1).T h e nθj = u0
hjxj−1 + u0










lmxm−1,x m−1)=xm−1.W h e nj −→ +∞
36,w eh a v eθj =( u0
hj + u0
lj)xn−1 ≥ u0
hjxn−1α. We know that kj is in [0,kKk] so
liminf u0
hj Â 0 and then liminf θj Â 0.I fK ∈ L+ take xi a strictly negative




ljxj−1,x j−1).T h e nθj = u0
hjxj−1 +u0
ljxj Â














deduce that liminf θj Â 0.





Then θj = u0
hjxj−1 + u0
ljxj Â 0 and θ1 = u0
l1x1 Â 0.
We have then found x =( xj)j≥1 ∈ l∞such that (θj)j≥1,j6=i = Hi(K)+
δHi(K) · x Â 0.T h e nK is a regular point for the inequality Hi(B) ≥ 0.F o r
i =1 , we can show similarly that if K ∈ L− ∪ L+ , K is a regular point for the
inequality H1(B) ≥ 0.¥
11.4 First order condition
















δ [ΨG](K) · ∆B






Replace δΨ1(G(K)) with (Ψ0
1,Ψ0
2,···) ,t h e n


























































¯ ¯ ¯ ¯ ¯
≺ +∞
If Ψ0










¯ ¯ ¯ ¯ ¯
≺ +∞
If K is such that D2U(ki−1,k i) ≺ 0 for all i ≥ 1,a c c o r d i n gt op r o p o s i t i o n 4 ,
K is Pareto-optimal.¥
11.5 Proposition8
Take all components of ∆G zero except ith equal to ∆g,a n ds the one-to-one
mapping on N∗ inverting i with n without changing the other indexes. (7)
implies that Ψ0
i(G)∆g = Ψ0
n(G)∆g.B u tlimn Ψ0
n(G)=0so Ψ0
i(G)=0for all
i ≥ 1.Reciprocally, if Ψ0
i(G)=0for all i ≥ 1, δΨ(G) · ∆G = Ψ0
∞(G)δ∞(∆G)
where ∆G ∈ c.L e ts be a one-to-one mapping on N∗. Suppose liminf s−1(n) ∈
N then there would be episodically p such that s−1(p)=l i mi n fs−1(n) which
is impossible since s−1 is a one-to-one mapping. Then liminf s−1(n)=+ ∞
which implies lims−1(n)=+ ∞.D e n o t et h enth term of b s(∆G) by s∆gn.W e
then have δ∞(b s(∆G)) = lims∆gn = lim∆gs−1(n) = lim∆gn = δ∞(∆G).T h e n
δΨ(G) · ∆G = Ψ0
∞(G)δ∞(∆G)=Ψ0
∞(G)δ∞(b s(∆G)) = δΨ(G) · b s(∆G)¥.
11.6 Proposition9
First, for an integer n ≥ 1,d e ﬁne sn such that if i or s(i) ∈ {1,···,n} then
sn(i)=i,e l s e: sn(i)=s(i). I ti se a s yt ov e r i f yt h a tsn is a one-to-one
mapping on N∗.F o rx ∈ Rn and G ∈ c denote xb sG the sequence obtained by
replacing the n ﬁrst terms of b s(G) by x. Notice that, as shown in the proof of
proposition8, if G ∈ c then b s(G) ∈ c. Ψ0
i(G)=0for all i ≥ 1 and G ∈ c implies
that the function f(x)=Ψ(xb sG) is constant on Rn. The 2 sequences b s(G) and
b sn(G) are equal from the n+1 th index, we can then write b sn(G)=xb sG,w h i c h
implies Ψ(b s(G)) = Ψ(b sn(G)). Now denote hp the pth term of b sn(G).I fp Â n
,t h e r ei sm Â n such that hp = gm.T h e nkb sn(G) − Gk =s u p pÂn |hp − gp| ≤
supm,pÂn |gm − gp| which tends to 0 when n tends to inﬁnity since G ∈ c.T h e n
Ψ(b sn(G)) −→ Ψ(G) which implies Ψ(b s(G)) = Ψ(G)¥
3812 Conclusion
The need to specify the concept of optimal growth path without inﬁnite horizon
optimization, has lead to try to mathematically characterize optimality between
generations in an OLG economy.
For Pareto-optimality, we establish, under some conditions, that for ”most”
generations we should have:
−D2U(kn−1,k n) ≤ D1U(kn,k n+1)
which means that if generation gn decreases its bequest by one unit, it wins less
than what is lost by generation gn+1.
To select from Pareto-optima, this paper introduces consensual optimality
with egalitarian and non-saturable-at-inﬁnity criterion. These concepts are used
for the deﬁnition of optimal growth paths, which are shown to converge neces-
sarily to the capital k∗ deﬁned by
−D2U(k∗,k∗)=D1U(k∗,k∗)
Moreover, with intra-life time neutrality, k∗observes the golden rule.
Then, with the use of familial altruistic utility, we have shown that if marginal
altruistic utility of bequest is equal to marginal selﬁsh utility of heritage, spon-
taneous equilibrium is consistent with optimal growth path.
However, bequests plans which are not in L− ∪ L+ have not been examined
here, particularly Pareto optima that cross cyclically the line L. They don’t meet
regularity requirement, but their study should be interesting. For example, it
could help know to what extent, changes in bequeathing behavior aﬀects long
period economic cycles.
It should also be interesting to drop intra-life time neutrality assumption
and see consequences on golden rule observance.
39Appendices
1 Norm and continuity of a linear functional
• By deﬁnition, a linear functional on a normed space X is bounded if and
only if here is M such as for all x ∈ X : |f(x)| ≤ M kxk.
kfk is the smallest of such M.
• A linear functional is continuous if and only if it is bounded35.
2 Proof of c∗
0 = l1
For i ≥ 1,l e tei be the element of l∞ such that all its components are zero
except the ith which is 1. Let x ∈ c0 and f ∈ c∗
0.W e h a v e
Pn
1 xiei −→ x,
so f (
Pn
1 xiei) −→ f (x),t h e n
P+∞
1 xif(ei)=f (x). One the other hand, f
continuous ⇔
|f(x)|
kxk ≤ kfk for all x ∈ c0 (see appendix1). keik =1gives
|f(ei)| ≤ kfk for all i ≥ 1.L e t α ∈ ]0,1[.T a k e xn = sign(f(en)) · 1
nα then









nα .T h e nϕ is bounded and decreasing on ]0,1[.
Hence, it has a ﬁnite limit as α −→ 0. We can show easily that this limit
is
P+∞
1 |f(en)|. Thus the sequence (f(en))n≥1 is in l1. Owing to the equality
P+∞
1 xif(ei)=f (x), we can identify it to f.
So c∗
0 ⊂ l1. The inverse inclusion is evident.
3 Hahn-Banach theorem
If f is a bounded functional deﬁn e do nas u b s p a c eM of a real linear normed
space X, then there is a bounded functional F deﬁned on X which is an exten-
sion of f and which norm is equal to kfk36.
4 Kuhn-Tucker theorem.37
Let X be a vector space and Z a normed vector space having positive cone
P. Assume that P contains an interior point. Let Ω be a subset of X with a
non empty interior.
Let f be a real valued functional on Ω and G a mapping from Ω into Z .L e t
x0 ∈
◦
Ω such that f and G are Gateaux diﬀerentiable at x0. Assume that the
35See Luenberger p104, quoted reference
36The proof of this theorem is given in Luenberger p111, but only in the case where X is
separable. l∞ is not separable, but, according to the same reference, with Zorn lemma we
can extend the theorem to a non separable space .
37For proof, see Luenberger p249, quoted reference
40Gateaux diﬀerentials are linear in their increments38. Suppose x0 maximizes f
subject to G(x) ≥ 0 and that x0 is a regular point of the inequality G(x) ≥ 0.
Then there is z∗
0 ∈ Z∗ , z∗
0 ≥ 0 such as
δf(x0) | y + hz∗
0 | (δG(x0) · y)i =0for all y ∈ X
and z∗
0 | G(x0)=0 .
5 Construction of E(K,r)
Let K ∈
◦
D and such that (k0,k 1) ∈
◦
Du. Denote S(K,r) the open sphere of
center K and radius r.T h e r ei sr0 Â 0 such that S(K,r0) ⊂
◦
D39.F o rr ∈ ]0,r 0]
deﬁne E(K,r)= ©
(kh,k l) ∈ R2Á∃B ∈ S(K,r) and i ≥ 1 such that bi−1 = kh and bi = kl
ª
.W e
have E(K,r) ⊂ Du.D e n o t eE(K,r) the closure of E(K,r).S i n c eDu is closed,
we have also E(K,r) ⊂ Du.M o r e o v e r ,i f(kh,k l) ∈ E(K,r),t h e r ei sB ∈ S(K,r)
and i ≥ 1 such that bi−1 = kh and bi = kl.T h u s|kh| = |bi−1| and |kl| = |bi|,
so |kh| ≤ sup(kBk,k 0) and the same thing for kl.B u t B ∈ S(K,r) implies
kBk ≤ kKk + r,s oE(K,r) ⊂ [0,sup(kKk,k 0)]
2,a n ds oi sE(K,r).C o n s e -
quently E(K,r) is a closed and bounded subset of R2,it is then compact.
We show now that there is r ∈ ]0,r 0] such that E(K,r) ⊂
◦
Du.D e n o t e
b Du =
½





Suppose that for all r ∈ ]0,r 0], E(K,r)is not included in
◦
Du.S i n c eE(K,r) ⊂
Du, it implies E(K,r) ∩ b Du 6= ∅.F o rr ≺ r0,w eh a v eE(K,r) ⊂ E(K,r0).L e t
rn be a sequence of ]0,r 0] decreasing to 0. The sets (E(K,rn)∩ b Du)n∈N are em-
bedded together. They are compact. Thus, their intersection ∩n∈N(E(K,rn)∩



















for all µ Â 0 there is i ≥ 1 such that k(xh,x l) − (ki−1,k i)k ≺ µ
x ∈ b Du =⇒
for all µ Â 0,S (x,µ) contains an element that doesn’t belong to Du.
38Theese hypothesises concerning Gateaux diﬀerentials are all veriﬁed when the functions
are Frechet diﬀerentiable.
39Proof:
Suppose that for all r Â 0 , S(K,r) cuts the border of D.L e t M be a point of (border
of D) ∩ S(K,r).S i n c eS(K,r) is open, it contains an open sphere of center M.S i n c eM is
a border point, the last sphere must contain an element outside of Dk. This contradicts the
fact that K is in an interior of D.
40Proof:
Let (Cn) be a sequence of embedded compact subsets. We extract from every Cn an element
xn. The sequence (xn) have an accumulation point x.W et h e ns e et h a tx ∈∩ nCn.
41Let α Â 0.I t a k e µ = α
2.L e t i ≥ 1 such that k(xh,x l) − (ki−1,k i)k ≺ α
2
and y/ ∈ Du such that k(xh,x l) − (yh,y l)k ≺ α
2.T h e n
k(ki−1,k i) − (yh,y l)k ≤ k(xh,x l) − (ki−1,k i)k + k(xh,x l) − (yh,y l)k ≺ α
Take B such that bj = kj for all j 6= i and j 6= i − 1,a n dbi = yl and
bi−1 = yh.
If i ≥ 2, y/ ∈ Du implies that B/ ∈ D .I fi =1then y ∈ S((k0,k 1),α).
Thus, for all α Â 0 we have either found B such as kB − Kk ≺ α but B/ ∈ D
or y ∈ S((k0,k 1),α) but y/ ∈ Du. This contradicts K ∈
◦
D and (k0,k 1) ∈
◦
Du¥
6 Frechet-diﬀerentiability on the border
While this property doesn’t add anything in the general case, it permits to
characterize border optima in the concave case.
Deﬁnition Let D be a convex subset of a real normed space Xand T a
transformation from D41 t oar e a ln o r m e ds p a c eY .D e n o t eb D the border of D.
b D = D−
◦
D. T is said to be Frechet-diﬀerentiable on the border of D if there is
for all x of b D a continuous linear transformation δT(x) such that
lim
x0∈D, x0−→x
kT(x0) − T(x) − δT(x) · (x0 − x)k
kx0 − xk
=0
Remark In this case, the Frechet-diﬀerential in not necessarily unique as it
is when T is deﬁned in a neighborhood of x. But we verify easily that, if we
deﬁne
◦
D − x =
½




, its restriction to
◦
D − x is unique.
7 U is Frechet-diﬀerentiable on the border of Du
Under 5-1 conditions on U and Du and for A ∈ b Du we show that:
lim
M−→A , M∈Du











Let α ∈ [0,1] , M ∈
◦
Du and ϕ(α)=U((1 − α)A + αM).S i n c e ]A,M] ⊂
◦
Du(accessibility lemma), ϕ is continue on [0,1], derivable on ]0,1] and ϕ0(α)=
− − →
∇U((1 − α)A + αM) ·
− − →
AM . Owing to the mean value theorem, there is β ∈
41We denote D the closure of D.
42]0,α[such that ϕ0(β)=
ϕ(α)−ϕ(0)
α .T a k e α =1 .T h e n ϕ0(β)=U(M) − U(A).
This gives
− − →
∇U((1 − β)A + βM) ·
− − →
AM = U(M) − U(A).S o :




























∇U((1 − β)A + βM) −
− − →
∇U(A)
° ° ° −→ 0 when M −→ A
If M ∈ b Du,It a k eM0 ∈
◦
Du such that MM0 ≤ AM2.



















































−→ 0 when M0 −→ A








−→ 1 when M −→ A




MM0.T h e n

















































−→ 0 when M −→ A
43¥
8 G is Frechet-diﬀerentiable on the border of D
Let K ∈ b D, r Â 0 and Sf(K,r) the closed sphere of center K and radius r.
Denote F(K,r)= ©
(kh,k l) ∈ R2Á∃B ∈ Sf(K,r) ∩ D and i ≥ 1 such that bi−1 = kh and bi = kl
ª
.
F(K,r) ⊂ Du and F(K,r) ⊂ Du since Du is closed.
I show like I have done in appendix5 for E(K,r),t h a tF(K,r) is bounded.
It is then a compact.
As in appendix5, although it is easier here because U is Frechet-diﬀerentiable





¤2 × F(K,r) to end to
lim
B∈D, B−→K







Let h ∈ c and let rn(h) be the sequence of c o b t a i n e db ys e t t i n gt o0t h en
ﬁrst terms of h.S i n c ef is a function from l∞ to R ,F r e c h e t - d i ﬀerentiable at
x0 ∈ l∞ , for all ε Â 0 there is α Â 0 such that:
khk ≺ α =⇒
|f(x0 + h) − f(x0) − δf(x0).h|
khk
≺ ε
But khk ≺ α =⇒ krn(h)k ≺ α for all n ≥ 1,t h e n
|f(x0 + rn(h)) − f(x0) − δf(x0).rn(h)| ≺ εkrn(h)k
Thus
¯ ¯ ¯ ¯ ¯









¯ ¯ ¯ ¯ ¯
≺ εkrn(h)k
Moreover, krn(h)k =s u p iÂn |hi|. It is a positive and decreasing sequence




∂xi(x0).hi −→ 0 when n −→ +∞.
Then
¯ ¯ ¯ ¯limsup
n




¯ ¯ ¯ ¯ ≤ ε|δ∞(h)|
which gives
¯ ¯ ¯ ¯














f(x0 + rn(h)) − f(x0)
δ∞(h)
We prove similarly the formula for liminf .¥
45Bibliography
Economics:
• Aghion P. § Howitt P.,“Théorie de la croissance endogène”, French trans-
lation Dunod Paris 2000
• Akari A., “Equilibre général et allocation optimale des ressources”,Etigraph,
Tunis 1999
• Allais M.,“Economie et intérêt”, Clément Juglar Paris(2i` eme edition) 1998
• Balasko Y. § Shell K., “The OLG model, I: the case of pure exchange
without money”, Journal of Economic Theory 23,281-306, 1980
• Barro R. “Are government bonds net wealth?”, Journal of Political Econ-
omy 1096-1117, 1974
• Beaud M. § Dostaler G., “La pensée économique depuis Keynes”, Editions
du Seuil Paris 1996
• Lakshmi K.R., “Two-sided altruism, Lindhal equilibrium and Pareto op-
timality in OLG models”, Working paper, University of Hawaii-Manoa
2002
• Mankiw G.N., “Macroéconomie”, French translation De Boeck Université
Bruxelles 2001
• Molina-Abraldes A., “A complete characterization of Pareto optimality
for general OLG economies”, Working paper, IEEG PBM 2001
• Solow R., “A contribution to the theory of optimal growth”, Quarterly
Journal of Economics vol 70 65-94 1956
• Wilson C.A., “Equilibrium in dynamic models with an inﬁnity of agents”,
Journal of Economic Theory 24, 95-111, 1981
Mathematics:
• Optimization by vector spaces, D.Luenberger, Interscience 1997
• L’analyse non linéaire et ses motivations économiques, J.P.Aubin, 1984
Masson Paris
• Optimisation intertemporelle application aux modèles macroéconométriques,
R.Marti, 1997 Economica Paris
46